Equilibrium unemployment as a worker screening device
In: NBER working paper series 4357
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In: NBER working paper series 4357
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 50, Heft 3, S. 321-370
ISSN: 1930-7969
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 313-335
ISSN: 1086-3338
This paper considers the role of reputation and signaling in establishing deterrence. The cost-benefit calculations of rational deterrence are extended to allow for incomplete or imperfect information. The author uses requirements of a sequential equilibrium (and its refinements) to impose consistency restrictions on how strategic players signal a reputation for strength. This provides a way to interpret potentially misleading reputations and offers a resolution to the reputation paradox of Jervis.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 313-335
ISSN: 0043-8871
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 32, Heft 3, S. 411-425
ISSN: 1552-8766
This article develops a rational theory of minimal nuclear deterrence: What is the minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power? By searching for the requirements of minimal nuclear deterrence, we hope to gain a better understanding of how to proceed with arms reduction without compromising the value of deterrence.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 32, S. 411-425
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
Minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 32, Heft 3, S. 411
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 198
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 9, Heft 2, S. 19-30
ISSN: 1549-9219
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 19
ISSN: 0738-8942
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 9, S. 19-30
ISSN: 0738-8942
Develops a stylized model of nuclear brinkmanship to study effects of threats that leave something to chance.
In: American economic review, Band 94, Heft 1, S. 382-390
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: American economic review, Band 89, Heft 3, S. 525-547
ISSN: 1944-7981
Using state-by-state voting data for U.S. presidential elections, we observe that voter turnout is a positive function of predicted closeness. To explain the strategic component of political participation, we develop a follow-the-leader model. Political leaders expend effort according to their chance of being pivotal, which depends on the expected closeness of the race (at both state and national levels) and how voters respond to their effort. Structural estimation supports this model. For example, a 1-percent increase in the predicted closeness at the state level stimulates leaders' efforts, which increases turnout by 0.34 percent. (JEL D72, C33, C72, H41)
In: Economics & politics, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 51-59
ISSN: 1468-0343
We analyze a voting model in which a democratic monopoly labor union rationally shrinks towards zero over time. In our model, preferences are not single‐peaked so that this shrinkage may occur in spite of objections by the median voter. We characterize the wage‐employment path as a function of the time horizon and the discount rate. We show that the employment path is independent both of the labor demand curve and of the workers'utility functions.